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ABSTRACT 
 
What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter’s partisan choice? 
Using post-election surveys of 14,000 voters in ten Australian elections between 1966 
and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local and national factors have on voters’ 
decisions. In these ten elections, the poor, foreign-born, younger voters, voters born since 
1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left-wing. Over the past 35 
years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has 
widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and 
between native-born and foreign-born. At a neighbourhood level, I find that, controlling 
for a respondent’s own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighbourhood 
characteristics, voters who live in richer neighbourhoods are more likely to be right-wing, 
while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighbourhoods are more likely to be 
left-wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect 
partisan preferences – Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally 
capable of governing in booms and busts.  
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JEL Classifications:  D31, D72, E24 
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1. Introduction
It is something of a truism that, in a democracy, the partisan choice is the most 
important decision made by the citizenry. Economic growth, income distribution, social 
policies, and even the decision to go to war are often affected by whether one party or 
another is victorious. Yet for all this, there is surprisingly little attention paid by 
economists to understanding the differences between parties, and what makes voters 
choose one party over another.  
One way of trying to understand what distinguishes political parties from one 
another is to compare outcomes under left-wing and right-wing governments (eg. Alt and 
Lowry 2000; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Bartels 2003; Leigh 2005). Yet because 
elections are relatively rare events, one quickly runs out of degrees of freedom, 
particularly when controlling for other factors. An alternative way of understanding how 
left-wing and right-wing parties differ is to explore the revealed preferences of voters. If 
voters are quasi-rational, then systematic differences in partisan choice should reflect 
how parties’ policies differentially affect groups within the society.  
To explore this question further, I utilize data from Australia, a country which has 
the dual advantages of a stable bipartisan system and compulsory voting. In common 
with several developed nations, post-election surveys have been carried out in Australia 
for nearly four decades, making it possible to create a large repeated cross-sectional 
dataset – the first of its kind – covering elections from 1966 to 2001. To presage my 
results, I find strong evidence that poorer voters, younger voters, those born since 1950, 
foreign-born Australians and men are more likely to favour the left-wing Labor Party. 
Additionally, living in a poorer, more unequal, or more ethnically diverse neighbourhood 
appears to make voters more likely to vote Labor. Lastly, using evidence from all 
Australian elections over the past century, I find no evidence of a systematic relationship 
between voters’ ideological preferences and the state of the national economy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a model of 
voting behaviour, and briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the data. 
Section 4 explores individual-level evidence on voting patterns. Section 5 analyses the 
effect of economic and ethnic differences at a neighbourhood-level. Section 6 looks at 
national macroeconomic variables, and the final section concludes.  
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2. A Model of Quasi-Rational Partisan Voting
Suppose that voter i must choose whether or not to vote for a left-wing party, and 
that voting is compulsory, so that if she chooses not to vote for a left-wing party, she 
must vote for a right-wing party (I ignore the possibility that she might vote for a minor 
party or cast a spoiled ballot).1 The voter’s decision will likely be determined by her 
expectation of how each party’s policies will affect her. Since government policies affect 
groups, rather than individuals, we can characterize this effect as depending on particular 
groups to which the voter belongs (X1). Parties’ policies may have a differing effect on 
people according to sex, age, year of birth, marital status, ethnic background, current 
income or permanent income. These group-specific effects are not restricted to 
observable factors: policies may also have a differential impact upon unobservable 
groups (X2), such as the diligent and the lazy.  
Further, the partisan choice may also be influenced by neighbourhood effects 
(X3). For example, a voter dwelling in a neighbourhood with few poor people may have 
less inclination to support anti-poverty policies than if the same voter lived in a less 
affluent area. Neighbourhoods may also affect voting patterns by influencing the way in 
which voters learn about parties’ policies. Additionally, because voters choose where to 
live, group characteristics may be systematically related to neighbourhood characteristics. 
I discuss below how to deal with this issue. 
Voters may have some prior beliefs about which party is better able to manage the 
economy in given situation (X4). For example, voters might prefer left-wing parties in a 
slump, since they are more generous with welfare payments, and believe that right-wing 
parties are better able to manage the economy in a boom, since they will keep inflation in 
check. Note that X4 can include both the levels of macroeconomic variables, and their 
change over the course of the electoral cycle. 
Lastly, voting preferences may be affected by what I will term ‘innate ideological 
attachment’ (X5), unrelated to a voter’s individual characteristics, locality, or the state of 
the national economy. Such ideological attachment may be a function of the group 
membership of the voter’s parents (for example, a rich person’s voting preferences may 
be affected by having grown up in a poor household), or to some factors about the voter’s 
background that are not directly observable.  
                                                 
1 For simplicity, I maintain this coding throughout the paper. Thus positive coefficients should always be 
interpreted as favouring the left-wing Labor Party, and negative coefficients as favouring the right-wing 
Coalition parties. 
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If we define X1 as the observable groups to which an individual belongs, X2 as 
unobservable group characteristics, X3 as the characteristics of the individual’s 
neighbourhood, X4 as national economic variables, and X5 as the voter’s innate 
ideological attachment, we can model the voting choice as: 
 
Pr(Vote for left-wing party) = f(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5) (1) 
 
Although political scientists analysing partisanship have often focused on party 
identification rather than on voting behaviour, the above model nonetheless captures two 
important perspectives in the party identification literature. Those from the “Michigan 
School” tend to regard party identification as primarily a psychological attachment, 
heavily affected in childhood and largely immutable (Campbell et al 1960, 1966). 
Revisionists, by contrast, believe that short-term influences such as party approval and 
candidate issue positions can have a strong effect on partisan identification and voting 
behaviour (Franklin 1984; Green and Palmquist 1990). The “Michigan School” would 
see X5 as the only important variable in the model, while revisionists would contend that 
X1, X2, X3 and X4 play a non-trivial role.2
Perhaps one surprising feature of the above model is that the incumbent party 
does not directly enter into the voter choice equation.3 During any election cycle, voters 
are assumed to update their beliefs about the impact that both parties’ policies will have 
on their groups. For example, if the incumbent party pursues a set of anti-immigrant and 
anti-poor policies, then the voting behaviour of a rich immigrant is indeterminate, and 
may depend on the political promises made by the opposition. However, it is still possible 
to derive the standard result from the macroeconomic voting literature from this model: if 
the economy performs badly over the election cycle, then (all else being equal) some 
                                                 
2 I am not aware of any studies which explicitly analyse these two perspectives through a rational voter 
framework, but it would seem that since parties sometimes change their policies, and voters sometimes 
experience unexpected changes in financial circumstances, the traditionalists’ theory of party identification 
is more difficult to reconcile with a rational voter model than the revisionists’ theory. 
3 Some might go further yet, and argue that only incumbency, and not partisanship, should be included in 
the equation. Under the median voter theorem (Downs 1957), politicians can be regarded as self-interested 
agents, interested not in ideology, but in the perquisites of office – making the labels ‘A’ and ‘B’ just as 
informative as ‘left’ and ‘right’. Yet as Roemer (2001) points out, the median voter theorem quickly breaks 
down in the presence of multiple issues and uncertainty. As most close observers of politics will attest (and 
as the revealed preference results of this paper evidence), persistent ideological differences separate the 
major parties in most democratic nations. 
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voters who previously supported the incumbent will come to prefer the opposition party, 
and the incumbent will be more likely to be voted out of office.4
In the Australian context, most research on partisanship has been of two types. 
The first uses electorate-level evidence, exploring the extent to which a party’s vote share 
in a given electorate is correlated with particular characteristics of that electorate (eg. 
Jackman 2003). While such evidence provides some overall sense of the underlying 
patterns, it suffers from a small sample size problem (there are only 150 federal 
electorates in Australia), and does not allow one to distinguish individual-level factors 
from neighbourhood-level factors.  
A second strand of the Australian literature has looked at the relationship between 
identities and voting behaviour. Substantial literatures exist on the relationship between 
self-identified class and electoral behaviour (Charnock 1977; McAllister 1992; Goot 
1994); postmaterialist values and voting (Gow 1990; Western and Tranter 2001); as well 
as the relationship between attitudes to leadership and voting (Marks 1993). Yet because 
partisan identification and voting behaviour are as much identities as class, 
postmaterialist values, and attitudes towards political leaders, it is difficult to see how one 
might unpack the causal relationship. Just as class identification could affect party 
identification, so the reverse might be true. This is not true of the factors appearing in 
equation (1), which are either impossible to change (sex, age, ethnicity), or so 
fundamental that they are unlikely to be affected by a change in party identification 
(marital status, income, education, neighbourhood).5 Moreover, the existing literature on 
voting patterns in Australia has focused on one or two post-election studies, while the 
present paper combines election studies over a 35-year period, allowing analysis not only 
of the relationship between voting and demographics, but of how that relationship has 
changed over time. 
 
                                                 
4 Note that if the effect depends on the individual’s own finances (the ‘pocketbook effect’), it will affect 
X2, while if it depends on macroeconomic conditions (the ‘sociotropic effect’), then it will affect X4. For 
analyses comparing the salience of these two types of effects, see Lewis-Beck (1986) and Markus (1988). 
5 Could the causal arrow run from ideology to income? This would be possible, for example, if left-wing 
individuals were more likely to take on lower-paying public sector jobs. Unfortunately, we have little 
reliable evidence either on the public-private earnings gap in Australia, or on the propensity for more left-
wing workers to choose public sector employment. However, the magnitude of this effect is limited by the 
fact that only 10 percent of Australian adults work in the public sector (Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
2004. Wage and Salary Earners, Public Sector, Australia. Cat No 6248.0. Canberra: ABS; and Australian 
Bureau of Statistics. 2004. Labour Force, Australia. Cat No 6202.0. Canberra: ABS). 
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3. Data
To explore these questions further, I utilize data from various Australian election 
studies, conducted between 1966 and 2001. For the purposes of this study, some of the 
post-election surveys which were conducted cannot be used, since key questions were 
omitted from some of the surveys. The final sample covers ten of the fifteen elections to 
have been conducted in Australia over the past four decades: 1966, 1969, 1977, 1983, 
1984, 1987, 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2001. Details of the surveys used appear in the Data 
Appendix. Table 1 presents summary statistics. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics    
 Mean SD N 
Year of birth 1940.34 19.10 13957
Age 45.07 16.05 13957
Female 0.49 0.50 13957
Married 0.71 0.45 13957
Divorced 0.06 0.24 13957
Family income (nominal A$) 23810.10 25380.15 13957
Years of education 11.96 1.87 13925
Born overseas 0.22 0.41 13957
Voted Labor (first preference) 0.49 0.50 13957
Voted Labor (two-party preferred) 0.46 0.50 5103
Labor in power when first voted 0.33 0.47 13957
Election 1985.10 11.59 13957
Mean income in neighbourhood (in 1996) 20342.28 4020.17 8627
Mean overseas-born in neighbourhood (in 
1996) 0.22 0.12 8627
Gini in neighbourhood (in 1996) 0.44 0.02 8627
 
Since the start of the twentieth century, Australian politics has essentially been a 
two-party contest between the left-wing Labor Party and one or more conservative 
parties.6 From the 1940s, a conservative coalition has been maintained between the 
National Party (formerly known as the Country Party), and the Liberal Party. These two 
parties are typically referred to collectively as ‘the Coalition’. I code respondents as 1 if 
they said that they voted for the Labor Party, and 0 if they voted for the Coalition. 
Respondents who said that they voted for any other party are coded as missing. Because 
the Australian electoral system allows for preferential voting, one would ideally like to 
take account of the second preferences of those who did not vote first for one of the 
major parties, but this question was unfortunately not asked in the earlier election 
surveys. According to Australian Electoral Commission statistics, over the ten elections 
                                                 
6 Though see also Mayer (1980, 353), who argues that such a characterisation is mere ‘chauvinism’. 
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in my sample, 11.9 percent of the electorate did not cast a first preference vote for one of 
the major parties (the comparable figure for all elections between 1949 and 2001 is 9.5 
percent). 
How truthfully did respondents report how they voted? Table 2 shows the true 
vote shares reported by the Australian Electoral Commission and the breakdown of first 
preference votes reported in the surveys (columns 1-4 are relevant here, columns 5-6 will 
be discussed subsequently). The mean absolute error is 2.5 percent, and in nine of the ten 
elections, the results are biased in favour of the eventual election winner. We can also 
calculate the pro-winner bias, which is 1.9 percent. The pro-winner bias does not appear 
to be significantly stronger for either party. The pro-incumbent bias is just 0.4 percent. 
Overall, there is no evidence of a significant bias in favour of either party. 
 
Table 2: Bias in election surveys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Immediate survey Survey after subsequent election
Election 
Labor 
vote 
(actual) 
Labor 
won? 
Labor 
vote 
(survey) 
Over-
reporting 
of Labor 
vote 
Labor 
vote 
(survey) 
Over-
reporting 
of Labor 
vote 
1966 0.445 N 0.408 -0.037 0.392 -0.053 
1969 0.520 N 0.499 -0.021   
1975 0.446 N   0.473 0.027 
1977 0.452 N 0.478 0.026   
1980 0.493 N   0.501 0.007 
1983 0.532 Y 0.572 0.041 0.603 0.071 
1984 0.514 Y 0.523 0.009 0.534 0.020 
1987 0.498 Y 0.529 0.030   
1990 0.476 Y   0.569 0.093 
1993 0.503 Y 0.507 0.003 0.512 0.009 
1996 0.451 N 0.411 -0.040 0.467 0.016 
1998 0.504 N 0.485 -0.019 0.477 -0.027 
2001 0.468 N 0.445 -0.023   
Average 0.484  0.485 -0.001 0.513 0.026 
Average of absolute values  0.025  0.036 
Note: In columns 5 and 6, the survey is the post-election survey for the following election. In effect, voters 
are asked to recall how they cast their ballot in a poll that occurred 2-4 years ago.  
 
4. Individual-Level Factors
To begin with, I explore the relationship between party preference and a basic set 
of demographic variables (the set of observable group characteristics described as X1 in 
equation 1). This involves estimating the following regression. 
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ittitit ZVoteLabor εγβα +++=)Pr(  (2) 
where the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the voter said that he or she had 
given their first preference vote to the Labor Party, and 0 if he or she had given their first 
preference vote to the Coalition (for simplicity, all outcomes in this paper will be denoted 
in the same fashion). Z is a vector of voter-specific characteristics: sex, age, education, 
marital status, whether born overseas, education, and income. To take into account the 
fact that support for the two major parties varies from one election to the next, I also 
include an election-specific fixed effect, γ (this term absorbs any retrospective voting 
effects). To estimate this regression, I use a probit model, though results are not 
substantially different if a logit model is used instead. 
The first column of Table 3 shows the results of this specification. Being female, 
older, richer, better educated, married or born in Australia predicts that individuals will 
be more likely to vote for the Coalition, and less likely to vote Labor.7 Columns (2) and 
(3) then re-run the specification for the first and last elections in the sample, to see how 
these coefficients have changed. Some clear changes are observable over this time period. 
Older Australians were more likely to vote for the Coalition in 2001 than they were in 
1966. Income polarization can also be observed, with poorer voters becoming more likely 
to vote Labor, and richer voters becoming more likely to vote for the Coalition. In 
addition, the gender gap (controlling for other factors such as education and family 
income) appears to have disappeared in 2001. 
To ensure that the differences between the coefficients in 1966 and 2001 represent 
a long-run trend, column (4) uses all ten election surveys, and interacts a linear time trend 
with each of the demographic variables. 
itttititit TZZVoteLabor εγββα ++++= 21)Pr(  (3) 
For simplicity, the primary coefficients on the demographic variables (β1) are not shown 
in Table 3, and the coefficients on the time trends (β2) are normalized so that a one-unit 
change represents the total change over the 35-year period 1966 to 2001. In general, the 
trend coefficients support the patterns observed from simply comparing the 1966 and 
2001 election surveys. Figure 1 presents selected coefficients in a graphical form – 
showing the marginal effect of age, income and gender on voting patterns in each 
election. 
                                                 
7 Of course, it might be the case that the age effect is really a cohort effect. I explore this issue in more 
detail in section 3.4. 
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I now turn to exploring the demographic factors in more detail.  
 
Table 3: How do individual demographics affect voting? 
Dependent Variable: 1 if voted Labor, 0 if voted Coalition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All 1966 2001 Trend coef. 
Trend    0.063 
    [0.056] 
Aged 30-39 0.006 0.003 -0.019 0.053 
 [0.015] [0.045] [0.053] [0.046] 
Aged 40-49 -0.029* 0.112** -0.041 -0.105** 
 [0.015] [0.045] [0.053] [0.046] 
Aged 50-59 -0.099*** 0.053 -0.131** -0.125*** 
 [0.016] [0.047] [0.052] [0.048] 
Aged 60 or over -0.166*** -0.083* -0.251*** -0.134*** 
 [0.014] [0.046] [0.048] [0.048] 
Income quintile 2 -0.042*** -0.075** -0.134*** -0.075* 
 [0.014] [0.037] [0.044] [0.041] 
Income quintile 3 -0.082***  -0.193*** 0.046 
 [0.015]  [0.044] [0.051] 
Income quintile 4 -0.119*** -0.236*** -0.212*** 0.085* 
 [0.015] [0.035] [0.044] [0.045] 
Income quintile 5 -0.197*** -0.377*** -0.281*** 0.140*** 
 [0.015] [0.028] [0.042] [0.048] 
High school only -0.102*** -0.059 -0.052 0.046 
 [0.014] [0.037] [0.051] [0.043] 
Diploma/trade -0.061*** -0.082** -0.047 0.045 
 [0.011] [0.037] [0.038] [0.036] 
University degree -0.025 -0.084 0.065 0.031 
 [0.016] [0.082] [0.048] [0.058] 
Born overseas 0.057*** -0.034 0.153*** 0.129*** 
 [0.011] [0.034] [0.034] [0.033] 
Female -0.076*** -0.135*** -0.009 0.098*** 
 [0.009] [0.027] [0.029] [0.028] 
Married -0.037*** 0.027 -0.034 -0.069* 
 [0.012] [0.037] [0.042] [0.038] 
Divorced 0.006  -0.024 -0.057 
 [0.021]  [0.062] [0.075] 
Election FE? Yes No No Yes 
Observations 13957 1448 1259 13957 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 
Observed Prob. 0.49 0.42 0.45 0.49 
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects from a probit model. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Excluded categories are as 
follows: age - those aged 18-29; income – first quintile; education – high school dropouts. Column 4 shows 
the coefficients on a time trend interacted with the demographic variable, where the time trend is 
normalized such that a one-unit increase denotes the average change from 1966 to 2001. In this model, the 
demographics are also included as main effects, but their coefficients are not shown. 
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Figure 1: How Have Age, Income and Gender Gaps Changed Over Time?
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Note: This figure repeats the exercise presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 for every election in the 
sample. In each case, it depicts three coefficients: age 60+, income quintile 5, and female.  
 
4.1 A Disappearing Gender Gap? 
Edlund and Pande (2001) have shown that since the early-1970s, US women have 
favoured the Democrats over the Republicans. Conversely, in most European countries, 
men were more left-wing than women from the 1970s until the mid-1990s. However, 
Edlund and Pande identify a common trend on both sides of the Atlantic: since the 1970s, 
US and European women have steadily become more left-wing. 
What about Australia? The tendency of women to favor the Coalition has been 
noted by several researchers (see Aitkin 1982; Renfrow 1994). In an innovative analysis, 
Leithner (1997) uses variation in gender composition across electorates to show that over 
the 1910-66 period, women were about 4 percentage points more likely to vote for the 
Coalition.8 The Australian gender voting gap persisted through the 1980s and 1990s; had 
only women voted, Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating would have lost the 1993 
election. 
But as in the US and Europe, Australian women have steadily become more left-
wing. By 2001, the Australian gender voting gap had entirely disappeared, regardless of 
whether or not one controls for other demographic variables. Looking first at the raw 
gender gap (without controlling for other factors) the difference between the sexes used 
to be substantial. In the 1960s, women were much more likely than men to vote for the 
                                                 
8 This 4 percent figure excludes the 1917 election, in which conscription was a major issue, and excludes 
those who voted for minor parties.  
 9
Coalition, by a margin of 8 percent in 1966 and 9 percent in 1969. But the raw gap was 
down to 4 percent in 1996, and 3 percent in 1998. In 2001 the pattern had reversed, with 
women 2 percent less likely to vote for the Coalition than men. 
The same story emerges when analysing the controlled gender gap. As Figure 1 
shows, the gender gap in Australia, controlling for other factors, was 14 and 11 percent in 
the 1966 and 1969 elections, but just 5 and 6 percent in the 1996 and 1998 elections. In 
2001, the controlled gender gap was 1 percent, indistinguishable from zero at 
conventional levels of significance. 
What might explain this change? In the US context, Edlund and Pande (2001) find 
that lower marriage rates and higher divorce rates account for much of the change. In 
terms of size-equivalised family income, divorce tends to make women poorer and men 
richer (the same is true in Australia: Weston and Smyth 2000). Hence more divorce 
should result in women being more likely to support the Democratic Party. This should 
hold even after controlling for income, since divorce will reduce permanent income as 
well as current income. Edlund and Pande find a strong relationship across US states 
between divorce rates and the political gender gap, and observe that after divorce, women 
are more likely to support the Democrats, and men are more likely to support the 
Republicans. Edlund, Haider and Pande (2004) also find support for this theory across 
nine Western European countries.  
An alternative theory might be derived from Leithner (1997), who finds a partisan 
gap between male and female trade union members, but no gender gap between those 
who are not members of a trade union. Leithner does not explore the dynamics of this in 
detail, but if one were to take union membership as exogenous, it could be posited that 
the decline in union membership since the 1960s was responsible for the closing of the 
gender gap. As union membership goes to zero, its differential impact on the gender gap 
could be expected to fall to zero. And indeed, union membership in Australia has 
declined sharply in recent years. Union membership in Australia was around 45 percent 
of the workforce from the 1960s until the mid-1980s, fell to 40 percent in the early-
1990s, and had dropped to 25 percent in 2001.9
 
                                                 
9 Union membership data prior to 1988 is based on figures reported by unions. Trade union membership 
was published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in its annual Labour Reports publications, and then in 
Trade Union Statistics (ABS Cat No 6323.0). From 1988 onwards, unionisation rates are available on a 
survey basis (Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2002. Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union 
Membership, Cat No. 6310.0. Canberra: ABS and its predecessor publications, beginning as Cat No. 
6325.0.) 
 10
Table 4 provides further evidence on these two hypotheses. Columns (1) and (2) 
re-analyse the sample, restricting the dataset to women and men only. A number of 
differences are immediately apparent. Age appears to have a stronger effect on the voting 
patterns of women, while income seems to have a stronger effect on the voting patterns of 
men. Being born overseas has a stronger impact on the propensity of women to vote 
Labor than men. Being married makes both men and women more likely to vote for the 
Coalition, but has a larger impact on men than women. Neither of the coefficients on 
divorce is statistically significant, though the signs are consistent with Edlund and 
Pande’s findings for the US (pro-Labor for women, pro-Coalition for men). 
Column (3) adds three new coefficients – union member, female*union member, 
and female*non-union member. The results support for Leithner’s trade union hypothesis 
(which were based only on data from 1993), across the pooled 1966-2001 sample. The 
coefficient on female*union member is -0.14, which is significant at the 1 percent level, 
while the coefficient on female*non-union member is small and insignificant. 
Yet care should be taken in interpreting these results. While Leithner appears to 
treat union membership as exogenous to party preference, it is difficult to see how this 
can be entirely true. Even if union membership is compulsory in certain workplaces, 
employees can still decide whether to join a union: by choosing between unionized and 
non-unionized occupations. The foregoing results provide some suggestive evidence that 
the decline of unionization is responsible for the narrowing of the political gender gap, 
but without a credible source of exogenous variation in union membership, it is difficult 
to be sure of this. 
 11
 
Table 4: What Explains the Gender Gap? 
Dependent Variable: 1 if voted Labor, 0 if voted Coalition 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Women Men Both 
Aged 30-39 -0.020 0.040* 0 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.016] 
Aged 40-49 -0.051** 0.002 -0.037** 
 [0.021] [0.022] [0.016] 
Aged 50-59 -0.129*** -0.058** -0.097*** 
 [0.021] [0.023] [0.016] 
Aged 60 or over -0.193*** -0.129*** -0.139*** 
 [0.020] [0.022] [0.016] 
Income quintile 2 -0.031* -0.058*** -0.062*** 
 [0.018] [0.021] [0.014] 
Income quintile 3 -0.095*** -0.081*** -0.099*** 
 [0.020] [0.023] [0.016] 
Income quintile 4 -0.118*** -0.131*** -0.139*** 
 [0.020] [0.022] [0.015] 
Income quintile 5 -0.175*** -0.221*** -0.212*** 
 [0.021] [0.022] [0.015] 
High school only -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.086*** 
 [0.019] [0.020] [0.015] 
Diploma/trade -0.101*** -0.031* -0.064*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.012] 
University degree -0.011 -0.036 -0.023 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.017] 
Born overseas 0.075*** 0.040*** 0.054*** 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.012] 
Married -0.034** -0.054*** -0.026** 
 [0.017] [0.018] [0.013] 
Divorced 0.007 -0.009 0.004 
 [0.027] [0.033] [0.022] 
Union member   0.277*** 
   [0.013] 
Female*Union   -0.142*** 
   [0.018] 
Female*Non-Union   -0.005 
   [0.011] 
Election FE? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6828 7129 12718 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Observed Prob. 0.47 0.51 0.48 
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects from a probit model. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Excluded categories are as 
follows: age - those aged 18-29; income – first quintile; education – high school dropouts. Column 3 
excludes the 1983 election survey, which did not ask about union membership. 
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4.2 Education 
As Table 3 shows, completing high school and having a trade qualification are 
both negatively correlated with voting Labor. Controlling for other demographics 
(including current income), high school graduates are 10 percent more likely than high 
school dropouts to vote for the Coalition, while those with a trade qualification are 6 
percent more likely than high school dropouts to support the Coalition. However, the 
relationship between education and voting is not monotonic. Those with a university 
degree are 3 percent more likely to vote Labor, but this marginal effect is 
indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of significance (p=0.12). Further tests 
also reveal that the high school graduate coefficient, the trade qualification coefficient 
and the university coefficient are all distinguishable from one another at the 5 percent 
level or better. 
What explains these patterns? First, it might be the case that what really matters is 
permanent income, not education, and education might merely be a strong proxy for what 
a person can expect to earn over his or her lifetime. Second, parties’ policies on higher 
education might have a differential impact on voting patterns by those with varying 
qualifications (it seems unlikely that this would be a major factor, since in practice 
education reforms typically only affect the small fraction of voters who are at university, 
not those who have already graduated with a given qualification). Third, those who do 
not pursue formal education could experience a different form of socialization from those 
who do complete formal education, and could adopt differing sets of partisan preferences 
as a result. 
A way of separating the first factor from the other two is to restrict the sample to 
those whose current income is most likely to be equal to their permanent income.10 An 
obvious group is males aged 35-55, a group who have relatively high labour force 
participation rates. Table 5 shows the results of this regression. Here, the only education 
variable which remains statistically significant is finishing high school, suggesting that 
there may be some difference in political socialization between those who drop out of 
high school and the rest of the population. However, beyond high school, education 
appears to only impact on voting patterns through the permanent income effect. 
                                                 
10 For an excellent discussion of transitory and permanent income, see Haider and Solon (2004). 
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 Table 5: Education or Permanent Income? 
Dependent Variable: 1 if voted Labor, 0 if voted Coalition 
 Men aged 35-55 only 
Aged 40-49 -0.023 
 [0.023] 
Aged 50-59 -0.063** 
 [0.027] 
Income quintile 2 0.032 
 [0.042] 
Income quintile 3 -0.003 
 [0.042] 
Income quintile 4 -0.092** 
 [0.040] 
Income quintile 5 -0.194*** 
 [0.040] 
High school grad only -0.081** 
 [0.032] 
Diploma/trade qualif. 0.001 
 [0.025] 
University degree 0.043 
 [0.034] 
Born overseas 0.077*** 
 [0.022] 
Married -0.026 
 [0.035] 
Divorced -0.024 
 [0.050] 
Election FE? Yes 
Observations 3003 
Pseudo R2 0.03 
Observed Probability 0.51 
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects from a probit model. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Excluded categories are as 
follows: age - those aged 35-39; income – first quintile; education – high school dropouts. 
 
4.3 Income 
The positive relationship between income and support for a right-wing party is 
perhaps the least surprising result in this paper. Yet it is worth exploring whether non-
linearities exist. In a univariate analysis, conducted at the electorate level, Jackman 
(2003) finds a non-linear relationship between electorate median income and Labor 
support across all seats, but a linear relationship when the analysis is confined to urban 
seats only. 
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In the foregoing analysis, income has been presented in quintiles, but to explore 
the issue of non-linearities further, it is worth looking at income deciles. To see this 
graphically, I estimate equation (2), excluding income. Figure 2 then charts the residuals 
from this regression against income deciles. In general, the relationship is monotonic – at 
any point, more income makes voters more likely to support the Coalition. But it also 
appears that the effect is strongest for the top and bottom deciles. Controlling for other 
factors, those in the bottom decile are 7 percent more likely to vote Labor, while those in 
the top decile are 15 percent less likely to vote Labor.  
As Figure 1 showed, the partisan gap between rich and poor voters fell during the 
1960s, and rose again during the 1990s (a similar rise can also be seen in the US: 
Stonecash and Mariani 2000). Adopting the revealed preference approach, this suggests 
that the Labor Party of today is more pro-poor than the Labor Party of the 1970s and 
1980s; that the Coalition of today is more pro-rich; or perhaps some combination of the 
two.11 The revealed preference approach also suggests from Figure 2 that the policy 
difference between the two parties is greatest in their treatment of the very poor and the 
very rich – a factor which appears to shed new light on the debate over party convergence 
(for a summary, see Goot 2004). 
                                                 
11 One reader of an earlier draft of this paper suggested that diverging voting patterns among rich and poor 
might be due to the fact that inequality has risen in Australia since the 1960s (for evidence on long-run 
trends in Australian inequality, see Leigh 2004). However, as will be shown in Table 10, the cross-sectional 
effect of inequality during the 1990s was to make voters more likely to support the Labor Party, with the 
impact being strongest on the rich. Though it is plausible that the effect of inequality on the income-voting 
relationship over time operates in the reverse direction to the effect of inequality in the cross-section, the 
results in Table 10 provide some evidence to suggest that higher inequality does not explain the growing 
income voting gap. 
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Figure 2: Is the relationship between voting and income nonlinear?
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Note: This figure runs the regression in column 1 of Table 3, excluding income, and plots the residuals 
against income deciles. The trend line is a quadratic. 
 
4.4 Age and Cohort Effects 
Until this point, I have included only age in the model, and characterized the 
results as showing that older voters are more likely to support the Coalition. Yet this is 
something of an over-simplification. While it could perhaps be the case that individuals 
are more likely to support the Coalition as they age, it might instead be the case that those 
born earlier in the century were more conservative than their children. (Of course, for this 
to be true, some other offsetting demographic shift would have to be present, given that 
Labor won two elections in the 1970s.) 
However, if one includes age and birth year in the model, then it is necessary to 
omit election fixed effects. Assuming that there is some fluctuation across elections that 
cannot be explained by age and cohort effects, such an approach is likely to be 
problematic. 
To solve this problem, I divide the sample into four cohorts: those born before 
1930, between 1930 and 1944, between 1945 and 1960 and after 1960 (the sample is too 
small to further break down the youngest cohort). In place of election fixed effects, I 
calculate for each cohort the fraction of voters in other cohorts who supported the ALP at 
that election. This “average ALP vote” variable captures factors that have nothing to do 
with age or cohort effects, such as the popularity of the party leaders at a given election. 
It is now possible to see whether there are still within-cohort age effects, and how these 
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age coefficients compare across cohorts. For simplicity, Table 6 shows only the age 
coefficients, though the model also includes controls for income, education, sex, born 
overseas and marital status. 
 
Table 6: Separating age and cohort effects 
Dependent Variable: 1 if voted Labor, 0 if voted Coalition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cohort born: Pre-1930 1930-44 1945-60 Post-1960 
Aged 30-39 -0.075 -0.008 -0.004 0.056** 
 [0.058] [0.034] [0.023] [0.028] 
Aged 40-49  -0.077** -0.060** 0.014 
  [0.038] [0.025] [0.095] 
Aged 50-59 -0.085*** -0.117*** -0.136***  
 [0.026] [0.034] [0.034]  
Aged 60 or over -0.178*** -0.161***   
 [0.025] [0.033]   
Average ALP vote in 
that election by other 
birth cohorts 0.461*** 1.808*** 0.744*** 0.898*** 
 [0.128] [0.263] [0.212] [0.236] 
Controls for income, 
education, sex, born 
OS, marital status? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4188 3448 4250 2071 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 
Observed Prob. 0.46 0.45 0.52 0.55 
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects from a probit model. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Excluded age category is 
those aged 18-29.  
 
The results from Table 6 suggest that most of the effect is due to age patterns, 
rather than cohort effects, with the age coefficients for the first three cohorts appearing to 
be quite similar. The largest age coefficients are for those aged 50-59, and those aged 60 
and over. Using the revealed preference approach, this suggests that the Coalition’s 
policies are significantly more generous towards retirees than Labor’s. 
The only group for which cohort effects may matter is those born after 1960, a 
group that does not exhibit the same lifecycle pattern as earlier cohorts. This could be due 
to one of two factors. One possible explanation is that a cohort effect is at work – since 
the results in Table 6 are consistent with the Baby Boomers being more left-wing than 
their parents (and differing little in ideological terms from Generations X and Y). 
Alternatively, it might be that the partisan age gap has widened over recent decades. As 
Figure 1 indicates, the partisan gap between voters 18-29, and voters age aged 60 and 
over, favoured the Coalition by 8 and 9 percent respectively in the 1966 and 1969 
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elections, but by 23 and 25 percent respectively in the 1998 and 2001 elections. While it 
is not possible to distinguish between a cohort effect and a changing age effect, it is 
notable that both theories have received anecdotal support, with some arguing that the 
socializing experience of growing up in the 1960s and 1970s led that cohort to be more 
progressive than their forebears, and others contending that the Coalition Government’s 
policies since 1996 have been particularly successful in winning the support of older 
voters (eg. Grattan 2004). 
 
4.5 Overseas-Born Voters 
Throughout the sample period, foreign-born workers were more likely to support 
Labor than the native-born. Moreover, the tendency of foreign-born voters to support 
Labor increased from 1966 to 2001. As column (4) of Table 3 shows, Labor’s advantage 
among those born outside Australia rose by 13 percent over this period. Although most 
developed countries have only a small fraction of their people born overseas, the foreign-
born population is a substantial portion of both the population and the electorate. In the 
1961 Australian census, 17 percent of the population was born overseas, and by 2001, 
this had risen to 23 percent.12 Twenty-three percent of the voters in the ten election 
surveys were born overseas (Table 1). 
However, it should be noted that both the composition of the foreign-born 
population in Australia has changed somewhat since the 1960s. In 1961, 54 percent of the 
overseas-born were from non-English speaking countries, and by 2001, this had risen to 
63 percent. If the difference between native-born and foreign-born Australians is driven 
by Labor’s policies on multiculturalism (McAllister and Makkai 1991), then those most 
affected will be likely to be voters whose first language is not English. The changing 
composition of the foreign-born population may explain at least part of the change in the 
foreign-born coefficient from 1966 to 2001.  
 
4.6 Who Swings? 
Before including regional and national characteristics in the model, I briefly 
digress to consider swing voters – those who report that they supported a different party 
in the previous election than they did in the current election. About one in ten of voters 
                                                 
12 Author’s calculations, based on data from Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. 2001. 
Immigration: Federation to Century's End, 1901-2000. Canberra: DIMA: 18-19; and Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. 2004. ‘Population: Country of Birth’ in Year Book Australia 2004. Canberra: ABS. 
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said that they were swingers, meaning that they switched from one party to another 
between two successive elections (for a historical analysis of swing voting in Australia, 
see Goot 1994, 175-179). 
In broad terms, two models might explain why voters change their party support 
from election to election. One model is that voters ‘swing’ because they steadily acquire 
more information about the policies of the major parties over successive elections. This 
model would predict that volatility in voting patterns would decline with age. An 
alternative model is that voters might swing because the parties themselves changed their 
policies. Unless this change was subsequently reversed, the coefficient for the favoured 
or disfavoured group should be significantly different from zero. Of course, the two 
models are not mutually exclusive. 
How well do voters recall the way they cast their ballots in the election before 
last? One way of answering this question is to again compare the reported voting patterns 
with the actual vote share recorded by the Australian Electoral Commission.13 Although 
emigration and the passing of some older voters will mean that the composition of the 
current electorate is not fully reflective of the electorate at the previous poll, this method 
should still make it possible to discern any significant biases.  
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 shows the results from this exercise. The mean 
absolute error is 3.6 percent, somewhat larger than when voters are asked how they voted 
in the last election (2.5 percent). The mean pro-winner bias is 2.5 percent, the mean pro-
incumbent bias is 1.9 percent, and the mean pro-Labor bias is 2.6 percent – all larger in 
these ‘election before last’ surveys than in the ‘last election’ surveys. The bias is smallest 
when the survey is conducted after an election in which the incumbent has been ousted.  
It is now possible to turn to analysing the factors that are associated with vote-
switching. Table 7 shows the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is 
not whether the respondent voted Labor, but whether she switched her allegiance. The 
dependent variable is 1 if the respondent voted for a different major party in the previous 
election and the current election, and 0 if she voted for the same party in both elections 
(this question was not asked in the survey following the 1966 election). As with the 
coding of the partisanship variable, I exclude those who did not respond, or said that they 
voted for a minor party in the previous election. 
 
                                                 
13 Of course, one cannot use the change in recorded primary vote share as a measure of the number of 
swing voters, since voters swinging in opposite directions will often cancel out one another. 
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Table 7: Who Swings? 
Dependent Variable: 1 if changed parties, 0 if same party 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Swing voter 
(either direction) 
Swung Coalition 
to Labor 
Swung Labor to 
Coalition 
Aged 30-39 -0.010 -0.004 -0.005 
 [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] 
Aged 40-49 -0.014 -0.010* -0.003 
 [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] 
Aged 50-59 -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.007 
 [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] 
Aged 60 or over -0.039*** -0.025*** -0.011* 
 [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] 
Income quintile 2 0.014 0.009 0.003 
 [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] 
Income quintile 3 0.015 0.018** -0.004 
 [0.010] [0.008] [0.006] 
Income quintile 4 0.006 0.005 0 
 [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] 
Income quintile 5 0.011 0.006 0.002 
 [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] 
High school grad only -0.012 -0.014*** 0.005 
 [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] 
Diploma/trade qualif. -0.004 0.004 -0.007 
 [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] 
University degree -0.008 -0.011** 0.003 
 [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] 
Born overseas 0.041*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] 
Female -0.010* -0.003 -0.006 
 [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] 
Married 0.004 0.000 0.003 
 [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] 
Divorced 0.007 0.015 -0.009 
 [0.013] [0.010] [0.008] 
Election FE? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11043 11043 11043 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.06 0.05 
Observed Probability 0.10 0.05 0.05 
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects from a probit model. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Excluded categories are as 
follows: age - those aged 18-29; income – first quintile; education – high school dropouts. 
 
Column (1) of Table 7 suggests that younger voters, foreign-born voters and men 
are all more likely to change their support from one party to the other. Yet this is only 
partially consistent with a policy learning explanation. Foreign-born voters are more 
likely to switch parties than native-born voters, and equally likely to switch from the 
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Coalition to Labor as from Labor to the Coalition, suggesting that those born overseas 
may be less committed to either of the major parties, and therefore more likely to switch 
between them. The data does not ask respondents how long they have been in Australia, 
but it would be an interesting question for further research to see whether foreign-born 
voters remain more likely to swing throughout their lives (suggesting that their degree of 
innate ideological attachment may be lower), or whether they become less likely over 
time to change their vote (suggesting that over successive elections, they learn more 
about which major party best serves their interests).14
The other significant result from column (1) of Table 7 is that older voters tend to 
be less likely to switch between parties. However, age seems to reduce the number of 
people who switch from the Coalition to Labor more than it reduces the number of people 
who switch from Labor to the Coalition. This suggests that two phenomena are occurring: 
voters seem to learn more about the major parties as they grow older; but older voters 
appear to be more loyal (‘rusted on’) to the Coalition than they are to Labor, indicating 
that the Coalition’s policies have become relatively more favourable to the elderly. 
Further evidence of the shifting policy explanation can be found among three 
other groups. High school graduates and those with a university degree were particularly 
loyal to the Coalition, while middle-income voters appeared especially inclined to switch 
to Labor. 
 
5. Neighbourhood-Level Factors
Next, I consider whether neighbourhood-level factors influence voting patterns. 
Characteristics of a neighbourhood may have a direct effect upon voters’ behaviour in a 
number of ways. In more diverse neighbourhoods, voters may experience a greater 
positive or negative externality from policies that affect other groups. For example, a 
voter in an ethnically diverse neighbourhood may experience a positive externality from 
more generous welfare programs for those born overseas; while for a voter in an unequal 
neighbourhood may feel some positive externality if more generous housing subsidies are 
provided. Even in the absence of policy spillovers, neighbourhood composition may 
affect voting patterns if individuals feel some sense of altruism towards those who live in 
their local area. And a third possibility is that there may be some local interaction effect, 
by which a person who is a member of Group A comes to favour the interests of that 
                                                 
14 Alternatively, it might be the case that these groups are less able to correctly recall how they voted in the 
previous election. 
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group more strongly as the share of the neighbourhood that are members of Group A 
expands. 
However, when analysing neighbourhood effects, it is important to recognize that 
where voters choose to live is often endogenous to their policy preferences. Thus a rich 
person who favours pro-poor policies may choose to live in a low-income 
neighbourhood. Naïve OLS or probit models that do not take this into account may derive 
biased estimates of the true neighbourhood effects. A possible solution to this problem 
was proposed by Dustmann and Preston (2001), who posit that families choose where to 
live at a very local level, but are constrained at a regional level – by factors such as a 
desire to be near their place of work, or to be within a reasonable proximity of family and 
friends. Using data from the UK, Dustmann and Preston instrument for racial 
composition in a ward (average size: 5000 people) with racial composition in the 
surrounding district (average size: 125,000 people) or county (average size: 1 million 
people). 
A similar approach can be applied in the present case. Using data from the 1996 
census, I am able to form measures of the composition of postal code areas (which I will 
term ‘neighbourhoods’). Because the Australian Bureau of Statistics provides a full 
tabulation of the census at this level, the measures are unaffected by sampling problems 
(see Data Appendix for details). The mean population in a neighbourhood (postcode area) 
is about 17,000 people. I then calculate statistics at the regional level, where regions are 
areas of about 450,000 people. Regions are either part of a major city, an entire minor 
city, part of a large state, or an entire small state or territory. For example, Parramatta, 
Tasmania, North Queensland and the Gold Coast are all distinct regions. Respondents in 
the sample are spread across 3350 neighbourhoods and 54 regions. 
Before using the IV strategy, I first estimate a naïve model, in which the 
neighbourhood characteristics enter directly into the model. If δ is a vector of 
characteristics of neighbourhood j: 
 
ijttjijtijt ZVoteLabor εγδβα ++++=)Pr(  (4) 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 presents the results from this specification. Since I only 
have data on neighbourhood composition from the 1996 census, the sample is restricted 
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to the 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2001 Australian Election Studies. Standard errors are 
clustered at the neighbourhood level. 
The results of this specification suggest that individuals in richer neighbourhoods 
are more likely to vote for the Coalition, controlling for the individual’s own income. A 
10 percent rise in mean neighbourhood income, according to the naïve model, raises by 2 
percent the probability that the respondent will vote for the Coalition. Conversely, a 10 
percentage point rise in the foreign-born population (about one standard deviation) boosts 
the Labor vote by about 4 percent. Inequality in the naïve model has no effect on 
voteshare. Further, it makes virtually no difference whether the model is estimated using 
probit or OLS.  
However, because an individual’s neighbourhood may be endogenous, I now 
estimate a two-stage model, in which δk is a vector of characteristics of region k. 
 
Stage 1: ijkttkijktj Z νγδρλδ ++++=  (5) 
 
Stage 2:  (6) ijttjijtijt ZVoteLabor εγδβα ++++= ˆ)Pr(
 
Because Stata does not facilitate clustering of standard errors in a probit IV model, I 
instead estimate the equation using a linear IV model, clustering standard errors at the 
neighbourhood level.  
Column (3) of Table 8 shows the results for this specification. The causal effect of 
living in a rich neighbourhood appears to be somewhat larger than in the naïve model – 
with a 10 percent rise in mean neighbourhood income boosting by 3 percent the 
probability that the respondent will vote for the Coalition. However, the causal effect of 
living in a neighbourhood with a higher fraction born overseas falls in the IV 
specification, with a 10 percent rise in foreign-born share leading to a 2½ percent 
increase in the probability that a respondent will vote Labor. Since the standard deviation 
of foreign-born across neighbourhoods is 0.12, a one standard deviation increase in the 
foreign born share is associated with a 3 percentage point rise in the Labor vote. 
Interestingly, while inequality had no effect in the naïve model, there seems to be 
a strong causal relationship between higher neighbourhood inequality and an individual’s 
propensity to vote Labor. The coefficient on the effect is -3.1, suggesting that a 2 point 
rise in the gini (the standard deviation between neighbourhoods) is associated with a 6 
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percent rise in an individual’s propensity to vote Labor. Comparing a one standard 
deviation increase in inequality with a one standard deviation increase in foreign born, it 
appears that the ‘inequality effect’ is larger than the ‘foreign-born effect’. 
 
Table 8: Neighbourhood-Level Factors (1993-2001 only) 
Dependent Variable: 1 if voted Labor, 0 if voted Coalition 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Probit OLS IV  
Log mean neighbourhood income -0.186*** -0.178*** -0.313*** 
 [0.049] [0.046] [0.093] 
Inequality in neighbourhood (gini) -0.268 -0.25 3.160*** 
 [0.359] [0.342] [0.986] 
Fraction born overseas 0.373*** 0.355*** 0.254*** 
 [0.069] [0.065] [0.096] 
Controls for age, income, education, sex, 
born overseas, marital status? Yes Yes Yes 
Election FE? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5894 5894 5894 
Pseudo R2 or R2 0.04 0.06 0.04 
Observed Probability 0.47   
Note: Column 1 shows marginal effects from a probit model; columns 2 shows OLS coefficients; and 
column 3 shows coefficients from a linear IV model, instrumenting for neighbourhood-level characteristics 
with regional characteristics. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the neighbourhood level, in parentheses.  
 
How do the neighbourhood effects operate? To see whether there is heterogeneity 
in the neighbourhood effects, Table 9 shows the results from interacting the 
neighbourhood-level characteristics with individual characteristics. As with equations (5) 
and (6), the interacted variables in Table 9 are neighbourhood-level interactions, but 
instrumented by their regional-level counterparts. In analysing the relationships, I assume 
that Labor governments tend to be more generous to the poor, and to those who were 
born overseas – which is consistent with the foregoing findings that poorer and foreign-
born voters are more likely to support Labor. 
To begin with, Column (1) of Table 9 interacts mean neighbourhood income with 
an individual’s income. The pro-Coalition effect of living in a richer neighbourhood 
appears to be strongest for the bottom 20 percent of the distribution (most consistent with 
a spillover or altruism explanation), with no significant effect on the second quintile. The 
impact on the top 60 percent of the distribution is similar (suggesting a local interaction 
effect). 
Column (2) interacts the fraction born overseas in a neighbourhood with whether 
the individual was born overseas. The effect of neighbourhood ethnic composition is 
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more than twice as large for the foreign-born population, suggesting that the ethnic 
composition effect may operate through immigrant organizations and networks, which 
would lead to both positive externalities and local interaction effects. 
The third column of Table 9 interacts neighbourhood inequality with individual 
income. Greater neighbourhood-level inequality appears to make the top four-fifths of the 
distribution more likely to vote Labor, but not the very poor. The inequality interaction 
results are consistent with either a spillover explanation (in which more generous 
programs for the poor have a positive externality for their more affluent neighbours), or 
with a local interaction explanation (in which rich voters in a more unequal 
neighbourhood are more likely to come into contact with the poor). 
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Table 9: Neighbourhood-Level Factors Interacted with Individual Factors 
(1993-2001 only) 
Dependent Variable: 1 if voted Labor, 0 if voted Coalition 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 IV  IV  IV  
Log mean neighbourhood income  -0.300*** -0.309*** 
  [0.095] [0.094] 
Inequality in neighbourhood 3.237*** 3.114***  
 [0.970] [0.988]  
Fraction born overseas 0.256***  0.251*** 
 [0.097]  [0.096] 
Mean income * Income quintile 1 -0.559***   
 [0.148]   
Mean income * Income quintile 2 -0.005   
 [0.131]   
Mean income * Income quintile 3 -0.375**   
 [0.158]   
Mean income * Income quintile 4 -0.281**   
 [0.141]   
Mean income * Income quintile 5 -0.360***   
 [0.138]   
Fraction overseas born * Native  0.181*  
  [0.108]  
Fraction overseas born * Born OS  0.460***  
  [0.155]  
Inequality * Income quintile 1   1.663 
   [1.587] 
Inequality * Income quintile 2   4.366*** 
   [1.535] 
Inequality * Income quintile 3   2.972* 
   [1.726] 
Inequality * Income quintile 4   4.023*** 
   [1.542] 
Inequality * Income quintile 5   2.898** 
   [1.471] 
Controls for age, income, education, 
sex, born overseas, marital status? Yes Yes Yes 
Election FE? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5894 5894 5894 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Note: All three specifications instrument for neighbourhood-level characteristics (and neighbourhood-
individual interactions) with regional characteristics (and regional-individual interactions). *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered 
at the neighbourhood level, in parentheses.  
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6. Macroeconomic Variables
Finally, I analyse the effect of macroeconomic factors on the decision to vote 
Labor. A number of Australian papers have shown a systemic relationship between 
macroeconomic outcomes and the incumbent voteshare (Jackman and Marks 1994; 
Jackman 1995; Cameron and Crosby 2000), and out-of-sample, the state of the 
macroeconomy has been shown to be a moderately accurate predictor of whether an 
incumbent government will be elected (Wolfers and Leigh 2002). When unemployment, 
inflation, GDP and the real wage are all included in the model, the two significant 
predictors of re-election are unemployment and inflation, which are both negatively 
correlated with the incumbent party’s vote share (Cameron and Crosby 2000; Wolfers 
and Leigh 2002). Table 10 replicates these results for the 39 federal elections from 1903-
2001, using the full specification of Cameron and Crosby (column 1), and a more 
parsimonious specification, with only unemployment and inflation (column 2).  
But aside from rewarding good economic management and punishing bad 
performance, do voters’ preferences for Labor or Coalition governments vary according 
to the economic cycle? To test this, I re-estimate these two macroeconomic models, now 
using the Labor Party’s share of the major party vote as the dependent variable, in place 
of the incumbent party vote share. To take into account the possibility that the Labor vote 
varies systematically with whether the party is in power, I also include a dummy variable 
denoting whether the Labor Party was the incumbent. 
Table 10 shows the results from this regression, with the full Cameron and Crosby 
specification (column 3), and with just unemployment and inflation (column 4). In both 
cases, the coefficients on the macroeconomic variables are statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. This is consistent with Cameron and Crosby’s finding that the interaction 
between the party in power and the state of the macroeconomy is statistically 
insignificant. 
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Table 10: Macroeconomic Factors (1903-2001) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
 
Incumbent voteshare Labor Party voteshare
Unemployment rate  -0.306* -0.424* 0.053 -0.289 
 [0.160] [0.251] [0.220] [0.272] 
Inflation  -0.374*** -0.199 -0.094 -0.117 
 [0.115] [0.175] [0.179] [0.194] 
Real GDP growth  -0.207  -0.155  
 [0.161]  [0.221]  
Real wage growth  -0.275*  0.027  
 [0.158]  [0.237]  
Honeymoon 4.313**  1.127  
 [1.749]  [2.135]  
Labor incumbent   3.572*** 4.001** 
   [1.224] [1.921] 
Observations 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.77 0.1 0.66 0.15 
Note: Following Cameron and Crosby (2000), unemployment rate is in the election quarter, while inflation, 
GDP growth and real wage growth are in the year prior to the election. Specifications in columns (1) and 
(3) follow Cameron and Crosby by including indicator variables for the elections of 1906, 1931 and 1975, 
plus separate dummies for the two world wars. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
7. Conclusion
Better understanding what makes individuals support a left-wing or right-wing 
party can provide new insights into how each party’s policies affect different groups in 
the population. The foregoing results suggest a number of systematic patterns. At an 
individual level, the poor, foreign-born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and 
unmarried voters are more likely to support the Labor Party. High school graduates and 
those with a trade qualification are also more likely to be Labor voters than high school 
dropouts and university graduates, but much of this appears to be a permanent income 
effect. Some degree of party polarization also seems to have occurred. Over the past 35 
years, the partisan gap has widened on a number of dimensions: between young and old; 
between rich and poor; and between native-born and foreign-born. However, the gender 
gap, which once saw women favour the Coalition by 14 percent, appears to have closed. 
Neighbourhood effects also seem to be important. Controlling for a respondent’s 
own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighbourhood characteristics, voters who live 
in richer neighbourhoods are more likely to vote for the Coalition, while those in more 
ethnically diverse or unequal neighbourhoods are more likely to support Labor. By 
contrast, no systematic pattern seems to emerge from the macroeconomic data. Australian 
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voters reward good economic management, but appear to regard the parties as equally 
capable of governing in good times and bad. 
Yet despite these distinct and significant patterns, we have still not accounted for 
a large portion of the variance in voting behaviour across the population. The R2 statistics 
indicate that the chosen set of individual characteristics (and the election fixed effects) 
explain just 3 percent of voting behaviour. Adding either birth cohort or neighbourhood 
characteristics explains an additional 1 percent. A full 96 percent of the variation in 
voting behaviour across individuals therefore remains unexplained. Returning to the 
nomenclature of the voting model set out in section 2, we have modelled X1 (the 
observable groups to which an individual belongs), X3 (characteristics of the individual’s 
neighbourhood), and X4 (national economic variables). What remains is X2 
(unobservable group characteristics) and X5 (the voter’s innate ideological tendency). 
Given that observable group characteristics account for only a small portion of variance 
in voting behaviour, I speculate that unobservable group characteristics probably only 
account for a relatively small fraction of the remaining variance. Notwithstanding many 
strong and systematic patterns in the data, a large portion of voter behaviour appears to be 
driven by innate individual characteristics, such as childhood socialization. 
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Data Appendix 
 
The surveys used in this paper are those which included questions on which party the 
respondent voted for the in previous election, plus a set of demographic variables. Those 
selected to be most important were age, sex, education, marital status, family income, and 
whether the respondent was born overseas. Of these, the last two variables turned out to 
be the most problematic. The 1987 and 1990 Australian Election Studies were excluded 
on the basis that they did not ask respondents any questions about income, while the 
National Social Science Survey: 1990 Election Panel Survey was excluded on the basis 
that it did not ask respondents whether they were born overseas (frustratingly, no 1990 
election survey asked respondents about both income and whether they were born 
overseas). All of the election surveys used in this paper were of the mail-out type. 
 
Generally speaking, comparisons of the demographics in the Australian Election Studies 
and the National Social Science Surveys suggest that the two surveys were similarly 
representative of the population. However, as Goot (2000, 48) has shown, tertiary-
educated respondents were over-represented in the AES – perhaps because it was 
conducted by mail. Only the 1993 AES is weighted, and although in theory it would be 
possible to use nearby census years to weight some of the other surveys, this was not 
done. Neither set of surveys appeared to suffer from a noticeably greater degree of pro-
winner bias than the other (see Table 2).  
 
At some point, it is possible that the dataset used in this paper may be made available 
(through the Australian Social Science Data Archives) to other researchers interested in 
exploring how Australian voting patterns have changed since 1966. In addition, I would 
be happy to supply any researchers with the Stata routine used to create the dataset. 
Those interested in using multiple Australian election surveys over a more recent period 
may also wish to contact Sinclair Davidson, Tim Fry and Lisa Farrell, who are presently 
creating a dataset based on all variables from the 1987-2004 Australian Election Studies 
(“Economic Reform and Australian Electoral Decision Making”, ARC Grant 
DP0449846). 
 
Coding of variables was straightforward in most all cases. Some notes on particular 
variables appear below. 
 
Education 
Educational attainment was coded into four categories: high school dropouts, high school 
graduates, some college or a trade qualification, and college degree (more detailed 
information on education existed in some, but not all, surveys).  
 
Income 
There was some variation in the number of income categories across surveys. There were 
8 income categories in 1966, 1969, 1977, 11 categories in 1983, 1087 in 1984, 108 in 
1987, 14 in 1993 and 1996, and 16 in 1998 and 2001. Except for 1984 and 1987, income 
was presented as a range, and individuals in each range were coded as having family 
income at the midpoint of the range, or 1.15 times the upper limit in the case of those in 
the top category. Lastly, it should be noted that, as a consequence of this categorization 
and the underlying distribution of incomes, no respondents in 1966 fell into the third 
income quintile. 
 
 34
Age 
The voting age in Australia was 21 until 1973, when it was lowered to 18. In most cases, 
the survey was restricted to those who were eligible to vote, but in the few cases where 
respondents report an age that would have made them ineligible to cast a ballot, they 
were dropped from the sample. 
 
Divorced 
In the 1983 survey, the categories ‘widowed’ and ‘divorced’ are combined into a single 
category widowed/divorced. To avoid discarding the 1983 survey altogether, I explored 
the age profile of widowed and divorced individuals in the earlier survey (1977, since 
there was no survey for 1980) and the subsequent survey (1984). In these two surveys, 
almost no younger women are widowed, and almost no older women are divorced. Of the 
208 respondents who ticked ‘widowed/divorced’ in 1983, I therefore assume that all 
widowed/divorced aged under 55 are divorced (99 respondents), and all 
widowed/divorced aged over 55 are widowed (109 respondents). 
 
Trade union membership 
With the exception of the 1983 election survey, all other surveys used in this analysis 
included a question on trade union membership. This question had a virtually identical 
wording in all surveys except 1993. In 1993, the question allowed the respondent to 
select either ‘trade union’ or ‘staff association’ (this was also the question in the 1990 
AES, but that survey is not used here).  
 
Although Leithner (1997) distinguishes these two groupings, it seems more likely that 
those who marked ‘staff association’ would have marked ‘trade union’ if it were the only 
option. To see this, note that if we combine ‘trade union’ and ‘staff association’ in 1993, 
the overall unionization figures appear to be 41.8% (1987), 29.5% (1993), 29.8% (1996). 
Alternatively, if we omit members of staff associations from the 1993 figure, union 
membership for the three years appears to be: 41.8% (1987), 23.4% (1993), 29.8% 
(1996). This would be inconsistent with ABS surveys, which show a steady decline in 
union membership over this period, not a rise between 1993 and 1996. See Australian 
Bureau of Statistics. 1997. Trade Union Members, Australia. Cat No. 6325.0. Canberra: 
ABS. (Note that while trends in trade union membership in the election surveys should be 
approximately comparable with ABS surveys, the levels are lower in the election surveys, 
since the ABS measures trade union membership as a fraction of employees, not the 
entire population.)  
 
Weights 
Only the 1993 survey is weighted. For all other variables, each individual is assigned a 
weight of 1. The weights are then recoded so as to balance the sample across elections, by 
ensuring that the sum of the weights for each election is 2000.  
 
Postal code variables 
For the 1996, 1998 and 2001 surveys, the postcode variable is only available on a 
confidential version of the survey instrument. I am grateful to the Australian Social 
Science Data Archive for temporarily sharing this confidentialised dataset with me. 
 
Regions 
Regions are defined as Australia Post BSP regions. 
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Postal code-level variables 
Postcode level variables are constructed from the 1996 census, for which the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics has published a full tabulation of income and birthplace by postcode 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics. 1997. CDATA 1996 CD-ROM. Canberra: ABS). Using 
this data, I create precise measures of log mean weekly individual income, fraction born 
overseas, and inequality among individuals (as measured by the gini coefficient) for each 
postcode area and region, unaffected by sample size problems.  
 
Macroeconomic Variables 
I am grateful to Lisa Cameron and Mark Crosby for sharing their dataset, which was 
subsequently updated by Justin Wolfers and myself (for more details, see Wolfers and 
Leigh 2002). 
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Appendix Table A: Elections in Sample 
Election  Study 
1966 D. Aitkin, M. Kahan and D. Stokes. 1967. Australian National Political 
Attitudes (ICPR Study No 7282). Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (also  
1969 D. Aitkin, M. Kahan and D. Stokes. 1969. Australian National Political 
Attitudes (ICPR Study No 7393). Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research 
1977 D. Aitken. 1979. Macquarie University Australian Political Attitudes 
Survey (ASSDA No 9). Canberra: Australian National University, Social 
Science Data Archives 
1983 T. Beed, E.M. Goot and J. Reark. 1983. Reark post-election survey (SSDA 
Study No. D0158). Canberra: Australian National University, Social 
Science Data Archives 
1984 J. Kelley, R. Cushing, and B. Headey. 1984. Australian National Social 
Science Survey (ICPSR 9084). Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research 
1987 J. Kelley, C. Bean and M. Evans. 1988. National Social Science Survey 
1987-1988: Inequality (SSDA Study No. 627). Canberra: Australian 
National University, Social Science Data Archives 
1993 R. Jones, I. McAllister, D. Denemark and D. Gow. 1993. Australian 
Election Study (SSDA Study No 763). Canberra: Australian National 
University, Social Science Data Archives 
1996 R. Jones, I. McAllister and D. Gow. 1996. Australian Election Study 
(SSDA Study No 943). Canberra: Australian National University, Social 
Science Data Archives 
1998 C. Bean, D. Gow and I. McAllister. 1998. Australian Election Study 
(SSDA Study No 1001). Canberra: Australian National University, Social 
Science Data Archives 
2001 C. Bean, D. Gow and I. McAllister. 2001. Australian Election Study 
(SSDA Study No 1048). Canberra: Australian National University, Social 
Science Data Archives 
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